Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) Funding Cuts

You’ll recall that last year in July, we received a message from Public Safety Canada indicating that:

“As a result of Public Safety Canada’s recent Strategic Review which is a federal exercise to ensure that all government programs are focused on results, provide value for money and are aligned with government priorities and federal responsibilities, decisions in Ottawa were made:

(a)              to close our Victoria office the next year or so, and

(b)              to reduce JEPP funding for 2011-2012 by $2 million; the reduction in funding will affect regular JEPP projects only; funding amounts allocated to JEPP USAR and CIP will not be affected”

Many of us took umbrage to the signal and some began letter writing campaigns.  I recall, in particular, the City of Richmond and the Ontario Association of Emergency Managers stepped up with the publishing of their public objections.  As a University Campus Emergency Planner, the JEPP funding cuts did not directly impact my community, but as an emergency manager, I was, along with my regional and municipal counterparts, dismayed.

In September 2010, I finally decided to write a letter to Senator Kenny (then Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on National Defence and Security – you know the group who wrote honestly about the state of Canada’s readiness in the face of emergencies / disasters in 2004 and again in 2008) about my concern about JEPP reduction in funding – I also cc.’d the Minister of Public Safety and the opposition critics on Public Safety.  Although there was more grim news and other reductions as part of Public Safety Canada’s strategic review, I chose to focus on the JEPP issue fearing that if I launched three balls I might overwhelm the catcher.  The letter is attached.

I never received any word back from our elected officials, but did receive a message from Senator Kenny many months later (he had taken ill).  In it he stated:

Thank you for your correspondences and I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your vigilance in ensuring the government takes action on the lack of funding in place for our Joint Emergency Preparedness Program.

I agree that the government’s reduction in the funding of emergency preparedness programs is alarming. As I no longer hold the position of Chair of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, nor do I even sit on the committee, I am left with very limited set of resources with which to pursue the matter of the Government’s lack of response to SCONSAD’s 2008 report on Emergency Preparedness in Canada.

In regards to actions that you may take to improve the situation for the JEPP funding, I would recommend that you raise the issue with the current Chair of SCONSAD, Senator Pamela Wallin at wallinp@sen.parl.gc.ca .

I commend you on the work that you are doing to improve the emergency management system in place in Canada and encourage you to continue in your efforts.

Since then, as Senator Kenny suggested, I’ve been in contact with Senator Wallin and have received her reply which I have her permission to share in order to ask you to help answer her “on point” questions:

Thank you for bringing this $ 2 million dollar funding cut to my attention. Can you provide me a list of projects that have failed to go ahead due to the cut, or an indication of how many fewer projects went ahead after the cut (before and after numbers), as well as details about some projects that have been recently funded (so I’ll have a better idea of their nature, and of typical per-project costs and cost-sharing)? Also, do you know if provinces and territories have compensated for the federal cut by increasing their own funding to this joint program, or have they likewise cut back? What do provinces typically spend annually on JEPP projects – do you know? I apologize for my office having neglected to follow up more speedily on this matter, and thank you again for letting me know about this.

I wonder if you’d help provide the information Senator Wallin is looking for?  If you agree and would like to provide your response through me, I am willing to consolidate the answers and reply to the Senator on our collective behalf. I’d like to respond to her as soon as possible, but understand the season we’re in.  If you’re going to help, please send me your input by September 16, 2011.

Thanks.

Guy Corriveau, CEM®

cptgmc@msn.com

Langley BC

NOTE: this e-mail has also been sent to BCAEM, the BC South West Regional Emergency Planning Committee, and Senator Pamela Wallin.

Public Safety Canada reduces JEPP funding — what?

I finally decided to write a letter to Senator Kenny (Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on National Defence and Security — you know the group who wrote honestly about the state of Canada’s readiness in the face of emergencies / disasters in 2004 and again in 2008) about my concern about JEPP reduction in funding – I also cc.’d the Minister of Public Safety and the opposition critics on Public Safety.  Although there is more grim news and other reductions as part of Public Safety Canada’s recent strategic review, I chose to focus on the JEPP issue fearing that if I launched three balls I might overwhelm the catcher.

The gist of my letter:

To my knowledge, global security, resilience, and readiness for emergencies and disasters remain concerns of governments.  Without wanting unduly to compare our Canadian efforts to bolster federal, provincial / territorial, and local emergency management activity with those of our American neighbours, I am amazed when I read that:

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano announces the fiscal year 2010 Preparedness Grants for nine federal programs—including critical infrastructure-related grants—totaling nearly $790 million to assist state, local and tribal governments and the private sector in strengthening preparedness for acts of terrorism, major disasters and other emergencies (Release Date: May 13, 2010, Office of the Press Secretary), and more than $1.8 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) preparedness grants designed to help states, urban areas, tribal governments and non-profit organizations enhance their protection, prevention, response and recovery capabilities for risks associated with potential terrorist attacks and other hazards (Release Date: July 15, 2010, Office of the Press Secretary).

In stark contrast, on July 16, 2010, I was shocked to hear that as a result of the recent Public Safety Canada (PSC) strategic review, a decision in Ottawa had been made to reduce the overall Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) funding for 2011-2012 by $2 million (of an $8.4 million / year program).  Even PSC acknowledged that this reduction in funding will definitely impact all provinces and territories across Canada, including BC whose funding has been reduced by a little over 35%.

 I remain particularly dismayed that a decision such as this one could be made without pan-Canadian stakeholder consultation and without regard for the (generally) lacking state of readiness which still exists at the local level, the level typically associated with JEPP funding requests.  Perhaps it was made because the security and emergency preparedness situation has gravely improved and no one has yet informed the emergency management community of professionals across the country?

 The disasters of the past few weeks have shown communities on both Canada’s west and east coasts suffer ravages from rains and Hurricane IGOR, consequently requiring support of provincial and federal governments.   Isn’t it precisely to help better prepare community response to events such as these that JEPP funding was initially put into service?

 JEPP is the only federal grant funding available I’m aware of to assist the local level in building resilience and increasing readiness levels.  In its 2008 summative evaluation of JEPP, Treasury Board itself found that “there is a need for the federal government to continue contributions to build capacity and capability for emergency management organizations at the provincial and, especially the municipals levels.”  Moreover, it found that “emergency preparedness at the community level would be significantly and negatively impacted by the absence of JEPP.”

 I hope you’ll agree that the current level of JEPP funding must be sustained, if not enhanced, and that The Standing Committee on National Defence and Security must continue to hold the government accountable on its efforts to improve Canada’s emergency mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery capacities.

 I am happy that some emergency managers are also writing letters, but am disappointed that we can’t organize a collective, strong, and unified response to a decision many of us disagree with.  Perhaps there might be some value in IAEM Council CANADA leading the charge on this?

Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM

to HERT or not to HERT: a Visit Report

Ex CADUCEUS MAJOR – Visit Report Observations from a visit to a joint full-scale exercise conducted by PHAC and PSC in Toronto (November 2007)

Background

The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) established the National Office of Health Emergency Response Teams (NOHERT) within its Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response to improve its ability to respond in a coordinated and efficient manner to support provincial, territorial and local government management of health emergencies.  The consequences of disaster often impose heavy demands on health systems to maintain existing health care services and to step up emergency treatment for disaster victims. In Canada, an afflicted jurisdiction can call on its neighbours and the federal government to draw upon additional all-hazards surge capacity such as NOHERT.

NOHERT is responsible to deploy all-hazards Health Emergency Response Teams (HERTs) that are capable of dealing with most emergency care priorities. The HERTs core capability contributes emergency medical response and mental health available for austere conditions. Teams can be enhanced with trauma, paediatrics, burn treatment, decontamination, infectious disease response and other capabilities to protect Canadians in need.

NOHERT leads Public Health Agency of Canada efforts to establish and train HERTs located in strategic locations across Canada. The Teams comprise practicing physicians, nurses, paramedics and other medical professionals who volunteer for up to two weeks of training and exercising annually. Medical Operations are supported by dedicated Mission Support Teams who manage all aspects of logistics and facilities administration onsite at a disaster location.

Exercise CADUCEUS MAJOR

NOHERT developed and designed this exercise to test the ability of HERTs to deploy and treat simulated patients with a range of serious injuries and ailments over a 24 hour period. PHAC’s National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS) provided portable hospital equipment and medical supplies and the logistics and transport needed to support the response.

For this exercise, NOHERT joined with Ontario’s Emergency Medical Assistance Team (EMAT) in order that interoperability could be assessed and best practices for medical operations developed. Exercise CADUCEUS MAJOR was conducted in joint partnership with Public Safety Canada’s Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Program. HUSAR Teams (Vancouver, Calgary, the province of Manitoba, Toronto and Halifax) were to demonstrate a continued ability to deploy and sustain operations using a unified command system.

The exercise scenario was set in the fictitious community of Constellation, Ontario – described as the financial centre of Canada. An explosion occurred in a busy office complex linked by a pedestrian walkway – it was not known if the explosion was a terrorist attack or accident. Massive and urgent efforts were required to evaluate risks of further explosions or possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. It would become quickly apparent that outside assistance would be needed to support intense efforts to stabilize damaged buildings, rescue trapped victims and provide immediate medical aid.

Organizers estimated that Exercises CADUCEUS MAJOR would represent one of the largest simulations of its type in Canada. Close to 1,000 personnel would be onsite, working 24 hours a day over the weekend as responders, simulated victims and evaluators. To prepare for the exercise, NOHERT trained 165 medical responders and mission support teams (who would maintain facilities and support medical operations). PHAC allocated $2.3M to equip and prepare HERTs to respond.

The key NOHERT goal was to gain the experience and hard evidence to validate a core or generic configuration and contribute to future HERT “blueprints”.

It was stated in writing that “NOHERT and its partners are committed to the development of a comprehensive approach to managing public health emergencies through a Pan-Canadian system with a robust, integrated and seamless emergency preparedness and response capacity. For Canadians, the benefit will be improved capability to face any disaster that would require prompt, organized medical assistance.”

 Observations

The observations I make by way of this Visit Report brush on my personal level of understanding, the scenario, the set-up, and interoperability and integration aspects of the HERT.  Although I might make observations on other aspects of the exercise, e.g. HUSAR, these are out of scope.

Personal level of understanding

I fully understand that an event such as an explosion in a downtown busy office complex in a “financial centre of Canada,” with the possibility of thousands of casualties, would create a considerable (overwhelming) surge on the affected community’s health services.  However, I would expect, following recent events beginning with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 series of attacks, and the London City bombings, that most urban hospitals today should have common, all-hazards, Incident Command/Management Systems in place and that these hospitals should also have areas internal to hospital (and perhaps immediately adjacent to the hospital) pre-designated for de-con, triage, minor treatment, etc., to alleviate the pressure caused by a surge event.  

Expectedly, there may be medical staffing, materiel, and accommodation resource shortages at (hospital) site and regional levels. It follows that, at provincial/territorial/federal levels, support/response initiatives should and would be focused on easing these expected resource shortages in short delay.  Unfortunately, what I learned and observed on November 23, 2007, did little to reassure me of any such thing.   

I found the statement in the backgrounder provided at the exercise briefing that “…HERT core capability [is designed] for austere conditions” a little puzzling.  Urban hospitals responding to disasters may indeed experience a lack of necessary resources, but are, in my opinion, far from suffering from “austere conditions.” Perhaps the word “austere” requires more explicit definition. In the mean time, it appeared to me that NOHERT capability, as demonstrated, is better suited to meet (intended for) more rural (austere) applications.

Scenario

The deployment of NOHERT resources was centered on an explosion in a “busy office complex linked by a pedestrian walkway…” with the possibility of “further explosions or possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.”

It was not stated explicitly in the backgrounder that the event was CBRNe associated, but mention of CBRNe was made at the briefing and was often overheard on site.  What was mentioned at the briefing, however, was that “…our cousins from CSIS have given us advanced notice of a possible event,” thereby allowing the pre-positioning of resources nearby.  I question the realism of this statement and assumption… How long would it take to assemble, deploy, and set-up NOHERT/NESS on zero notice?

In this scenario NOHERT is supported by NESS and Ontario EMAT resources.

Set-Up

Staging Area.  The staging area was adjacent to the Regal Constellation demolition site which was “moulaged” to add realism to the scene.  I overheard many oohs and ahhs, and would agree that “tent city” was quite impressive. Nevertheless, I have many questions surrounding this type of deployment in support of an urban scenario.

Tent City

The scenes of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, Ground Zero at NYC, and the City of London in the immediate after-math and beyond show no pictures of tent cities, lumber mills, or on-scene treatment areas. The evidence to date would suggest that first responders (with augmentation from other agencies and organizations from other jurisdictions and surrounding areas) work hard to rescue, triage, stabilize, and transport as quickly as practicable to existing health services institutions, i.e., hospitals.

In response to a sudden impact mass casualty event, hospitals and health service providers activate their mass casualty incident plans, innovate, and improvise to the best of their ability and resources and begin receiving casualties from EMS, self-presenting, or otherwise.  In the urban setting, I can’t think of a better way to deal with casualties but to rapidly transport them to established trauma centres.

With respect to the proximity of “tent-city” to the disaster site, I understand and the organizers explained that it would not necessarily be as close to the wreckage (and potential danger) as it was. But it does beg the questions: “If the event were to happen on the corner of Bloor and Yonge, where would you find the real estate to set all of this tentage, and generators, and semi-trailers, and lumber-mill?” “Would you really have to?” and “What if it was a CBRNe event?”  I did not notice (was not shown) any decontamination areas or HOT and COLD Zones. There was only one “Triage” entrance and was in no way ready to receive dirty patients.

Lumber-mills. In any case, and back to the set-up, I was awed that in the 21^st century we should be relying on lumber as much as it appeared we were.  Lumber may be available in large quantities in this country, but how long would it take in a sudden-impact mass casualty event to have all of this lumber found and delivered to the site? Where did it all come from?  Is it part of the HUSAR inventory?

MB USAR Lumber Mill

Although outside the scope of this observation report, I was amazed that Canadian Heavy Search and Rescue Task Forces resource inventory would not include re-usable hydraulic stabilization, jack systems, and other wreckage support/shoring systems other than lumber milling equipment. Are the table-saws and other carpentry equipment part of the HUSAR inventory? I noticed a large component of the MB HUSAR Task Force was committed to carpentry.  Is this the best use of EMS/FireFighter and Rescuer resources?

Another surprise to me, and others in our tour group, was that these hundreds of pieces of lumber would be manually hammered together.  In response to a question from our group, the Tour Guide explained that powered hammers are too imprecise for use under these conditions and circumstances. I did not understand.

Portable Power. I was also surprised to see tons of NESS crates (more lumber) lying around the site unopened including many crated 10KW generators.  My observations revealed many rental generators on site prompting my question to the Tour Guide: “Why aren’t we using and testing the NESS generators?”  To which he replied: “Don’t know.”  Is it because uncrating the NESS equipment means that the equipment has to be re-crated later?  On this topic, why hasn’t NESS considered disbanding its carpentry shop in favour of ruggedized, re-usuable, colour-coded, plastic crating?

Equipment. It was not obvious to me what the rational was for using EMAT vs. NESS equipment, but I’m almost certain that EMAT equipment predominated the scene – the equipment in use in the medical tents appeared modern (packaged in ruggedized, re-usable, colour-coded, plastic crating) and included patient monitoring equipment, which I don’t believe is included in NESS stocks.  It was also not obvious that NOHERT/NESS connected well with the provincial EMAT.  Generally, I found the site quite untidy with NESS crates and NESS stocks strewn all over the place. 

NESS Stretchers

Medical Tent Equipment

Medical Tent Crowding

Ontario EMAT Equipment

 

Personnel Accommodations. Our Tour Guide and most of the others in expensive paramilitary wear were eager to tell us how little sleep they were operating on.  I found this condition of sleep-depravation an unsafe practice (given the work environment, consequence of error, life-safety, etc.) and disconcerting. Moreover, I was shocked at the pride NOHERT/NESS expressed over the self-contained capability of the teams/taskforces. I would have thought that the life-safety implications of the work would dictate that rescuers get better treatment than to sleep on cots under canvas in adverse weather.  I should think that, in the urban setting, hotels would be relatively vacant and that room availability would be high.  Failing that, I should think that, in the urban setting, other hard shelter arrangements would be relatively easy to make.

I don’t get the attraction to battle-like accommodations, in the urban setting, when other options are rife.  I obviously didn’t see the same glamour in the “austere” conditions of NOHERT/EMAT/HUSAR as others may have seen.

I haven’t had time to survey the aspects of HUSAR in other countries, i.e., US, Australia, New Zealand, France, UK, Germany, Israel, etc., but would be curious to compare and contrast capabilities and mind-set.

MASH.  Why would you want to set a MASH (Triage and Treatment for Red, Amber, and Green Casualties) up in the urban setting teeming with trauma hospitals?  On the medical set-up, I found access doors too narrow for speedy movement of casualties, was dismayed by the uneven floors and rail systems (stretcher and litter obstacles as well as human hazards) running across certain doorways, was shocked at the less than sterile conditions of the whole area, and was surprised at all the white-boards and markers for representation of the medical situation.  When our Tour Guide was asked about automation support to the medical task, he answered: “we don’t want to be reliant on power for good management of the situation…”. I did not hasten to add that the whole set up is reliant on power.

MASH Crowding

Floor Obstacles

Situation Tracking

The scenario described in the initial briefing called for thousands of casualties.  I found the medical set-up overcrowded by staff and believe that the expectations that this type of set-up would be able to handle this type of load optimistic at best – unrealistic at worst.

There were allusions to a CBRNe event, which should have called for a chemical/biological/radiological decontamination capability and a trauma unit for blast lung, severe burn, eye, ear, and head injury.  I didn’t observe (was not shown) any such capability.

 Interoperability and Integration

Coming from a Regional Health Authority background, I was expecting to see some kind of link between NOHERT/EMAT and the standing health provider system. I saw nothing. I heard nothing. What I observed was a quasi-independent Triage and Treatment facility seeming to be working in isolation from existing health provision structures.

Some of the questions that came to mind were: Are all EMS systems continuing to function as normal? Are the EMS resources entering the event site to collect and transport casualties to hospitals?  Who gets what REDS, GREENS and AMBERS?  Are NOHERT resources tracking all casualties or only the ones they are handling? Is the health system tracking all casualties or only the non-NOHERT ones?  What about R and I? Where should families call for information regarding the status of loved ones?  Where are the NOHERT interfaces to existing social structures? Where are the NOHERT interfaces with local and existing psychosocialspiritual resources? What are the palliative resources of NOHERT?  What are the interfaces with provincial/local coroners?

I didn’t observe (was not shown or explained) the lines of authority between NOHERT and the local health authority and provincial health department.  On what authority is NOHERT deployed?  To whom does it report on arrival?  On what authority is NOHERT released?  The existence of interfaces and the capabilities of interoperability and integration are unknown to me.  

Final Comments

Immediately following a disaster event, medical staffing, materiel, and accommodation resource shortages at (hospital) site and regional levels should be expected — counted on.  It follows that, at provincial/territorial/federal levels, support/response initiatives must focus on easing these expected resource shortages in short delay.  I believe in the NOHERT concept of deploying all-hazards health emergency response teams capable of dealing with most emergency care priorities. It is valid and implementation is necessary.  To enlist teams of practicing physicians, nurses, paramedics, and other medical professionals supported by dedicated Logistics Teams for rapid deployment to a disaster scene anywhere in the country would certainly bolster medical readiness capability and grant a sense of hope to all of those local and regional health provision sites who shudder to think how they might respond on their own or even collectively to a mass casualty event, let alone one involving chemical or biological contamination.

It isn’t clear to me how the NOHERT demonstration of November 23, 2007 helps a hospital experiencing medical staff and materiel shortages fulfill its role of “first receiver” in a mass casualty incident.  

Hospitals in general and EDs in particular need to be augmented and supported in responding to and recovering from disaster events. The provincial framework in which hospitals are found must be able to request support from the federal authority who, ideally, would be able to call upon its deployable resource (NOHERT) and task it to the province who may sub-task it to a regional health authority until no longer needed (as determined by the province or the regional health authority).  

The NOHERT, in my opinion, does not have to come self-contained for 10 days or with all of the ancillary or equipment demonstrated.  Rather, it should come ready to plug in and respond to the requirements of the requesting framework and to the requirements dictated by the event.  Instead, the officials responsible for the conception and implementation of NOHERT should consider establishing event specific teams with event specific equipment. 

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

Have you read the Senate Report on Emergency Management in Canada yet?

William Petak, writing in the Public Administration Review back in 1985, said: “Only when public administration fully accepts and prepares to meet the challenge of achieving efficient and effective emergency management will we see a significant reduction in human suffering and economic loss due to unnecessary exposure of people and property to the risks associated with a complex, technologic, urban society.”

Introduction. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Report entitled: Emergency Preparedness in Canada: How the fine arts of bafflegab and procrastination hobble the people who will be trying to save you when things get really bad... (http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Committee_SenRep.asp?Language=E&Parl=39&Ses=2&comm_id=76), was released for public consumption September 2, 2008. The report comprises four volumes, but one need only read the first volume (225 pages) to get the full picture. 

The 2008 Report follows an earlier report from March 2004 entitled: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines, which I read at the time with great interest and naive anticipation of a transformation. Four years later, after having read the follow-on, I’m disheartened but not surprised by the finding that the Government has been unhurried to address the 2004 recommendations. I am, however, grateful to Senator Kenny and his Committee for not letting up on the Government and for revealing / confirming our Emergency Management shortfalls here in Canada.

I believe that Senator Colin Kenny (Chair) and his Committee deserve to be commended for their discoveries and recommendations. I, for one, wholeheartedly agree with the tone of the Report and empathize with the frustration experienced by Senator Kenny, his Committee, and the surveyed practitioners in Emergency Management. I’ll readily attest that watching paint dry is not, nor ever will be, an enviable endeavour.
Although it would be my pleasure to provide additional support to each of the Committee’s twelve recommendations, I’ll leave it to others to pick up on this possible theme for future articles. In the mean time, with your permission kind reader, I’ll comment generally on Recommendations 6, 8, and 9 in two parts, namely: “Lessons Learned” and “First Responder.” Finally, I’ll offer an opinion on “Competencies.”

Lessons Learned. One of the characteristics of disaster (emergencies) I’ve found is “memory effacement.” Otherwise put, memory becomes a post-event casualty. As we have all witnessed, our concern for all of the obstacles and barriers experienced during the disaster response seem to fade quickly once the post-event mutual congratulations take over. “What a great job we all did!” becomes the enduring quote.

I strongly agree with the Committee and surveyed practitioners that too many disaster (emergency) responses have not been clearly audited or recorded for prosperity in “lessons learned” documents. What’s more is that the information from after-action reports might help (if acted upon) to develop and implement mitigation strategy as quickly as practicable after the event and before the next one. Hey, there might even be consequential (and drastic) reductions in the nearly billions of dollars doled out by Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements post-event!

First Responders (…and the rest). There can be no argument regarding the vital and integral role played by First Responders with respect to public safety and life saving – a role vastly intensified by disaster events. Moreover, I agree that the First Responder must be given more consideration than has been given, especially in the areas of training, communication, equipment, and information.
However, in order to clear up any misconception that First Responders should be considered de facto emergency managers, I suggest that the role of Emergency Managers needs to be more fully understood and underscored. First Responders have a specific role to play which should be free from the encumbrance of additional Emergency Management responsibilities [see Competencies below].

In addition to emphasizing the importance of the First Responder and the Emergency Manager, their functions and requirements, there are others who are equally integral to Emergency Management and who might also have requirements for training, communication, equipment, and information including:

 Provincial / territorial / municipal elected and appointed officials responsible for the administration of emergency management legislation and other statutory Acts and Regulations; and 

First Receivers, i.e., the nurses, physicians, emergency social service staff, psycho-social and spiritual professionals, and Non-Government Organizations who are there to collect, triage, and treat a) those delivered by First Responders and b) those who self-present for treatment or solace and comfort. 

Another group of stakeholders who should be kept in the information loop are the higher learning and certificate students of Emergency Management and their professors / instructors.

Competencies. Like Senator Kenny and his Committee, I find it shocking, if not alarming that the Government of Canada doesn’t demonstrate a better comprehension of the criticality of Emergency Management. However, in thinking about why the government’s responses and attitudes might be what they are, perhaps the issue of “competency” may play a part.

Emergency Management is not, nor should be, the province of the “hacker.” How many in the employ of government at all levels are acting as Emergency Management professionals without the necessary competencies? How many got the job from having missed “that” meeting, or just being at the wrong place at the wrong time? I wonder, are there any financial analysts crunching numbers in government without credentials in accounting?

I ask these questions because Emergency Management (formerly “Emergency Preparedness” – dating back to Civil Defence and Cold War days) is finally evolving into a profession. In the main, it is now realized there is too much at risk in the improper management of disasters / emergencies (loss of life, destruction of property, harm to environment) to leave it to folks who, albeit well-intended, may not fully comprehend the business of disasters, the business of management, or the business of best or evidence-based practices for managing the mitigation of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from disasters. What’s important to know is that the business is more than just “preparedness and response.”

The generally accepted definition of Emergency Management today is the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which “communities” (defined as you like) reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with emergencies. In the context of most essential public sector activity, this function could be further characterized by:

a) enabling mitigation of and preparedness for actual and potential threats within geographical areas of responsibility;

b) facilitating and maintaining a heightened state of readiness throughout those geographical areas of responsibility to assure prompt, safe, correct, and consistent response to and recovery from a disaster / emergency using an all-hazards approach; and

c) promoting the safeguarding of population served while continuing to provide “continuity of government” through the disaster / emergency event.

Discounting the intense and sustained effort involved in responding to an event, Emergency Management is a full-time job which includes the performance of regular hazard and vulnerability analyses, capability assessments, and resource inventories; the preparation, conduct and evaluation of exercises (table-top, functional, and full-scale) and drills; the development and revision of all-hazards plans and guidelines, and disaster specific annexes; the maintenance of operations centre readiness; and on-going professional development obligations.

On the subject of achieving competencies, I discovered a few years ago that the Government of Canada (Public Service Commission) offered a Career Assignment Program which outlined Manager Leadership Competencies in a comprehensive and impressive document. This document could formerly be found at http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/cap/03/mgnarr_e.htm, but I can’t find it anymore. I’ve also noticed that Treasury Board has no problem detailing the core competencies required by management staff in IT projects in the Canadian federal government at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/emf-cag/project-projet/documentation-documentation/pmcc-cbgp/pmcc-cbgp01-eng.asp. I’m compelled to ask “why couldn’t the Government of Canada provide the same stringent requirements in the area of Emergency Management (a profession)?

I don’t want to take up much more of your time dear reader, but I’m including a link to a paper entitled: “Outlines of Competencies to Develop Successful 21st Century Hazard or Disaster or Hazard Risk Managers” by Wayne Blanchard, PhD, CEM®. It’s dated, but only goes to show that the evolution of Emergency Management as a profession is not new (http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/downloads/CoreCompetenciesEMHiEd.doc).

Conclusion. I want to reiterate that I sincerely appreciate and am grateful to Senator Kenny and his Committee for revealing / confirming our Emergency Management shortfalls here in Canada.
I believe that the Report correctly and appropriately underscores areas where the Government of Canada needs not only to put a more urgent face on Emergency Management, but to address the problems identified with more than “bafflegab and procrastination.” I only hope that this Report will get more attention than did the 2004 one. It can only get better — right?

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

CEM in Canada eh?

By Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

USA CEM® Commissioner and Vice Chair USA CEM® Commission

(Manager Emergency Planning for Kwantlen Polytechnic University,
British Columbia, CANADA)

 

Introduction.

In the past few years, much work has been done by many in Canada to help establish a Canadian Council of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). At the same time, Canadian emergency management practitioners have been hearing about the Certified Emergency Manager (CEM®) credential and have perhaps been wondering “what it is,” “why bother,” “waiting for a Canadian version,” “isn’t this a marketing tool for membership to the IAEM?”

At the time of this writing, there are more than 1106 CEM®s: with 38 CEM®s across Canada. Over 440 emergency managers have been certified for more than five years and over 207 emergency managers have been certified over ten years.

This article intends to answer questions you might have and to shed some light on the CEM® certification and process to provide a knowledge base to aid you, fellow emergency manager, in making a decision as to whether you should certify. It supplements a previous article entitled: “CEM® News: Why Certify?” by Daryl Spiewak, published in the May 2003 edition of the IAEM Bulletin (please see http://members.iaem.com/membersonly/bulletin/documents/may03bulletin.pdf)

Definition of Certification

Professional certification is a formal process of making certain that an individual is qualified in that field in terms of particular knowledge, skills and abilities. It is the procedure through which an official designation and distinction is obtained and typically involves rigorous verification, validation, standardized testing, a maintenance routine and adherence to a Code of Ethics and professional conduct. Certification programs are peer reviewed and fostered and are preserved by a certifying agency/professional association.

Professionals may pursue certification to receive recognition of professional competence; to join an established network of credentialed peers; and to take advantage of enhanced career opportunities.

What is CEM®?

According to the IAEM CEM® application booklet, “The term “Certified Emergency Manager” designates prescribed training and educational criteria plus a working knowledge of all basic tenets in disaster/emergency management that are encompassed in the phases of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. In addition, “CEM®” clearly denotes interactive experience and knowledge of community-wide participation in planning, coordination and management functions designed to improve disaster/emergency management capabilities.”

“A Certified Emergency Manager® is an individual who possesses the knowledge, skills and abilities to effectively manage a comprehensive disaster/emergency management program. That program can be in, but not limited to, government, business and industry, military, health care facilities or educational institutions.”

According to the IAEM CEM® application booklet, “The Certified Emergency Manager can effectively accomplish the goals and objectives of disaster/emergency management in all the environments listed above with little or no additional training or orientation.” So, the CEM® certification raises the bar in emergency management and provides the public or the enterprise the emergency manager serves a certain assurance that requisite qualifications and standards have been achieved.

The CEM® designation is internationally recognized. The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the US National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) continues to support the CEM® certification program and the Canadian Region of the International Association of Emergency Managers endorses CEM® certification.

Why bother?

Today, Canadian emergency management job postings are beginning to specify that the successful applicant must be CEM® or willing to certify CEM® within a fixed time. In the US, it is increasingly difficult for applicants to find emergency management jobs in any sector (particularly the public sector) that
do not call for CEM® certification.

Employers seeking emergency management professionals are becoming more aware that a CEM® is more likely to effectively manage a comprehensive and integrated emergency management program; is more likely to have a comprehensive understanding of the basic components of emergency management; is more likely to be aware of the essential requirements of cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency coordination in emergency management activity; and is more likely to accomplish the goals and objectives of any emergency management program in any environment with little or no additional training or assistance.

CEM® Requirements

To meet CEM® requirements, you must demonstrate three years full time comprehensive experience in the field of emergency management including participation in a full-scale exercise or a in an actual disaster; must have completed a baccalaureate degree (or, for Councils outside USA, until 2013, an equivalent of two years for each 30 university credit hours up to the 120 credit hours required for most degrees); must have undergone 100 hours of emergency management-specific training as well as 100 hours of general management training; must have contributed to the field of emergency management in at least six different areas such as professional membership, public speaking, published articles, service on volunteer boards or committees, teaching, conference attendance, chairing or leading groups or activities, or other participation in any other extraordinary endeavors; and must author a management essay demonstrating emergency management knowledge, skills and abilities.

CEM® Certification Process

Each application packet is registered and receives two independent reviews. If there is agreement with the application packet’s disposition, it is processed accordingly. If there is disagreement, the application packet receives a third independent review. The three reviewing Commissioners then
deliberate the findings to determine the next course of action.

Unsuccessful applicants are provided with a detailed, written explanation of  the Commission’s evaluation and suggested improvements, if applicable. Successful applicants receive a letter indicating their achievement and outlining the next steps.

Examination

Although candidates typically take the examination after their application packet has been successfully reviewed, a candidate may choose to take the examination prior to submitting the initial application packet to the CEM® Commission. The examination consists of 100-question multiple-choice questions based on the categories established by NFPA 1600. To pass the examination, a candidate must correctly answer 75 questions.

In making ready for the examination, you may avail yourself of the preparatory courses and/or study guide found at  http://iaem.com/certification/CEMPrepCourse.htm.

A Canadian version?

The CEM® Commission has internationalized the CEM® examination with the goal of providing all candidates a core-question component (70 percent) along with a country/council-specific- question component (remaining 30 percent). Canadian CEM® candidates are now taking an examination that includes Canadian content.

The CEM® Commission

A CEM® Commission of emergency management professionals (including representatives from allied fields, public sector, academia, industry, and military) administers the CEM® certification process, reviewing candidate applications and providing recommendations to the Global CEM® Commission who oversees the overall CEM® Program. Each CEM® Commissioner volunteers to serve one three-year term with the possibility of one three-year extension.

There have been three Canadian Commissioners since 1998, namely:

Mark Bennett, CEM®            (1998-2000),

Warren Leonard, CEM®        (2000-2004), and

Guy Corriveau, CEM®           (2005-2011).

Since the recent establishment of IAEM Councils around the world, there is a provision for these to establish their own CEM® Commissions provided they meet certain criteria (the subject of another article perhaps?). To date, only the USA, and a combined ASIA-OCEANIA Councils have their own CEM® Commissions.

In the meantime, Councils are invited to send representatives to sit and learn for a year term on existing CEM® Commissions. Canada has two such representatives on the USA CEM® Commission, Jennifer Smysnuik, CEM® and Deirdre McLachlan, CEM®. The USA CEM^® Commission provides IAEM-Canada with as many seats as are needed to evaluate Canadian applications; as application volume grows, additional seats will be designated. Perhaps, the USA CEM® Commission will, one day, morph to a North America CEM® Commission?

Marketing Ploy?

The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) is a non-profit organization consisting of over 5000 emergency managers worldwide. IAEM, since its founding in 1952 as the US Civil Defense Council, then the National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management, has consistently promoted the goals of saving lives and protecting property during emergencies and disasters. IAEM membership is not a requirement of certification.

The fees generated by the certification process seldom cover the expense of administering the program. Therefore, the CEM® certification is not a marketing ploy. It is a service provided by the association for emergency managers and those who hire them.

Conclusion

This article provided you with some knowledge about the CEM® certification and the certification process. It also answered questions you may have had about how this all relates to you, a fellow emergency manager. So what are you waiting for? You are now more informed, hopefully more motivated to request a CEM® Application Packet, better prepared to submit your application and ready to take the examination to become a CEM®.

Good luck.

Please see http://www.iaem.com/certification/generalinfo/cem.htm for additional information and  http://www.iaem.com/documents/IAEMNewsRelease062807.pdf to read about the Associate Emergency Manager (AEM) certification program available to emergency managers.

At the time of this writing, there are more than 99 AEMs world-wide: 9 AEMs across Canada.

September 14, 2011

All-Hazards

All-Hazards approach does not focus on specific hazards but concentrates on a solid framework that ensures jurisdictions will be better prepared for all disasters. From this framework, the functions common to most disasters can be strengthened and those unique to specific hazards can be addressed.

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

Recovery

Recovery. Once the disaster has been stabilized and the immediate life-saving and property (environment) prtoection actions have been generally completed, attention must be focused on returning the site/facility, its operations, its personnel, and its damaged areas to pre-disaster state. The short-term focus should be on returning critical operational and support systems to minimum operating standards, as well as on providing timely debriefings and assistance sessions with staff. Longer term activities, which may require a number of years, should focus on personnel assistance and conseling (as necessary) and restoring the site/facility to normal. During recovery, opportunities for planning to reduce future disaster impacts are frequently available.

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

Response

Response activity is the execution of disaster action plans.

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

Preparedness

Preparedness has to do with making ready for potential and evantual disasters. Activities, programs, and systems under this heading are developed and implemented prior to a disaster and are used to support, test, prove, and enhance resonse to, and recovery from disasters.

Preparedness, i.e., the ability to take appropriate and effective action in response to disasters must be continually maintained. As part of preparedness work, plans must be updated, equipment must be serviced and tested, personnel must be trained, and procedures and systems must be exercised.

Training, exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions are central to the preparedness function.

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

Mitigation

Mitigation consists of planned and orderly efforts to prevent those hazards that are preventable and to lessen the impact of those that are not.

The design and implementation of a hazard mitigation strategy requires technical capability, resources, and the cooperative efforts of a number of diverse groups.  While many targets of opportunity will be present after a disaster, an effective mitigation strategy should begin as soon as the hazards analysis is completed and should focus on a set of deliberate, well-reasoned policy decisions based on a long-term view.

Over time, the cumulative effect of mitigation actions, even if individually small, can make a significant impact on the degree of risk faced by a facility, and may serve to lessen the damage to property and the harm to life and limb.

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®