Prescribing the Operations Centre

Introduction

There remains some confusion by many in the lay world (to whom most Emergency Managers report) regarding “Operations Centres.” In the first place, “what exactly are they called?” Naming conventions for the “Centre” change from site to site and organization to organization. For example, there are Operations Centres, Command Centers, Incident Command Centres, Situation Centres, Emergency Operations Centres, War Rooms, and Command Posts.

In the second place, those who are designated as principals in organizational response and recovery plans are often heard asking: “What are these places? Are there major differences between each of these iterations? What’s their purpose? Who staffs them? What do they look like?”

Are the answers to these questions as varied as the nomenclature? Are confusion and head scratching about “Operations Centres” characteristics of disaster management?

This article offers a prescriptive definition and description in an attempt to allay some of the confusion surrounding Operations Centres, and further offers a provocation to thought as to the space, materiel, and administrative requirements typically associated with one.

Note: This article speaks to Operations Centres in the context of Incident Command.

What’s in a name

Not long ago, I was invited to speak on the topic of Disaster Management and was asked what I would name the presentation. I landed on the title: “Emergency, Disaster, Crisis, Calamity, or Bad Day?”

I mention this to make the point that, although the literature can be trusted to provide detailed differences between one term and the other, the reality is – the names people use to describe events are often interchangeable.

Let’s agree for the remainder of this article on the use of the term “Operations Centre” abbreviated as OpsCen.

Defining an OpsCen

An OpsCen contains the accommodations and communications necessary to direct disaster response and recovery operations. It is staffed by representatives from the functional sections of an organization’s incident management  team, but its precise staff makeup is determined by the senior leader (Incident Commander) as dictated by the requirements of the situation.

Its primary functions include the provision of:

a. a physical link between corporate office and its affected sites/facilities, or

b. a physical link between management and staff involved in event response and recovery operations,

c. a real-time communication capability between the organization and other (external) responding agencies,

d. an effective and efficient mechanism to provide real-time information to the Incident Commander regarding any significant development,

e. an effective and efficient mechanism to maintain an inventory of organizational resources and to facilitate their deployment and commitment,

f. an effective and efficient means to acquire needed resources from the organizational supply chain, or from suppliers and/or other involved agencies/jurisdictions, and

g. timely and accurate information to higher authority, e.g., corporate HQ/board of directors in the private sector or municipal/county/state (provincial)/ federal officials in the public sector.

How much bigger than a breadbox is it?

The commonly held perception that an OpsCen is a single, albeit, large room accommodating all those with principal roles in disaster management, including the Incident Commander, must be dispelled!

Events requiring the use of an OpsCen are usually characteristic of an increased reliance on information. Decision-making under disaster circumstances poses challenges not normally experienced in day-to-day operations and will almost certainly be exacerbated by noise, confusion, and chaos.

In an effort to impose order and structure where there may be little or none, an OpsCen provides a number of functionally specific areas. Figure 1 offers a sample and generalized sample of the Opscen.

Figure 1

The first of these, which I shall refer to as a Situation Room, is dedicated to the management of response and recovery operations, e.g., deployment and employment of personnel, requesting and releasing resources, ongoing monitoring of the situation, and providing up-to-date information to the Incident Commander. Figure 2 provides an example of an austere Situation Room configuration, while Figures 3 and 4 show more elaborate setups.

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

The Situation Room is “activity central” and highly reliant on information collection, display, and distribution. It’s staffing is normally limited to those who are assigned roles and responsibilities regarding the minute-byminute, hour-by-hour management of operations and access to it is strictly controlled. The exact makeup of the staff assigned to the Situation Room is typically situation-dependant, but would intuitively include a combination of Command Staff,  Operations, Logistics, and other principals responsible for the management of event activities.

The Situation Room is not a gathering place for curious onlookers. It is not a location intended as a space from which to conduct media or other briefings, nor is it a location conducive to strategic, planning, logistic, administration or finance meetings. Rather, it is an information hub for the Incident Commander’s – a decision-making assistance tool. It is a location the Incident Commander may visit or occupy from time to time to collect real-time situation reports and updates.

A Planning Room is dedicated to those responsible for fully assessing the situation, determining the length of an operational period, forecasting the requirements of the next operational period and beyond, revising existing action plans or crafting entirely new action plans as the situation warrants and/or as the Incident Commander may direct. The Planning Room is the location of the organization’s brain-trust and the province of the Planning Chief. Dependant on availability of space and resources, the Planning Room may resemble a typical conference room as shown at Figure 5.

Figure 5

When planners are somewhat removed from the minute-by-minute, hour=by-hour din, they are more easily able to step back from the action, collate and analyze the situational information, and make sounder recommendations to the decision-making authority.

Not unlike the Situation Room, the Planning Room is also heavily reliant on information collection and display. Its access is restricted and the Incident Commander visits from time to time to receive situation forecasts, courses open, and action recommendations.

A Briefing Room is provided for the use of the Incident Commander or the organization’s Public Information Officer to conduct media/public information briefings. Those from external agencies, including the media, who request information must be suitably accommodated without interfering or interrupting the response and/or recovery operations being conducted throughout the OpsCen. See Figure 6. 

Figure 6

A Communications Room is a location from which alternate communication means may be provided to the OpsCen. It could allow, for example, the installation and operation of an Amateur Radio Station (example at Figure 7) staffed by ARES volunteers.

Figure 7

A separate and secure Server Room accommodates the requisite number of file servers and a workspace for a programmer/maintainer.

Paper copies of Disaster Management Plans, Disaster Management documentation, periodicals, books, brochures, pamphlets, newsletters, and information sheets published by various other agencies and jurisdictions should be at hand. A Library serves as a resource centre for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery literature, research activity, and educational material including training aids and lesson plans.

An OpsCen includes offices. While it is not the intent of an OpsCen to necessarily provide office space for the organization’s entire staff, the principal actors in the organization’s incident management structure certainly require adequate accommodation. The Incident Commander, for example, should have an office appropriate to conduct regular meetings with command staff and section chiefs. Likewise, Command Staff and each Section Chief may be provided an office from which to work (when not busy in the situation room) and from which Section Chiefs may conduct meetings with their individual division heads.

There should also be an area designated as a Labour Pool and Volunteer Services Coordination Room. Those not engaged in continuity of operations or disaster response and recovery activities are centrally registered for assignment to any one of the Incident Management System’s sections through the Planning Section. Dependant on space and resource availability, a Labour Pool and Volunteer Services Coordination Room may be configured as Figure 8.

Figure 8

A Rest Area for those participating in protracted operations is necessary. However, the Rest Area is not a location where participating personnel can microwave food or purchase vending machine snacks or drinks, sit and eat. Rather it is a quiet, comfortable, softly lit area where OpsCen staff may take a few moments away from the high intensity of disaster operations. There ought to be as little distractions in this area as possible. An example visualization of a Rest Area is at Figure 9.

Figure 9

A Nutritional Area is available where OpsCen staff may store and cook food, eat and drink.

The expected number of staff/visitors involved in response and recovery activity at an OpsCen during a disaster event determines the allocation of adequate washrooms. The 24-hour, 7-day/week nature of OpsCen duties may also warrant the provision of shower facilities for shift workers or workers that are sheltered in place.

An Administration Area provides space for telephone and in-person reception, mail sorting, PC and facsimile use, secure file storage, and photocopier operation.

Finally, the quantity and frequency of meetings held with external agencies/organizations dictate a requirement for a Reception Area that, at a minimum, allows seating and coat storage. (Administration and Reception Areas at Figures 10 and 11).

Figure 10

Figure 11

As can plainly be seen from the above, an OpsCen comprises many component parts. While some organization office suites may satisfy an OpsCen’s space requirements in full, others may not. What’s important is to understand the specific characteristics of an OpsCen and, as much as practicable, to designate appropriate space as necessary.

What else is required?

Although space designations go a long way toward implementing an OpsCen, without the tools enabling functionality in each dedicated room — an OpsCen may as well be a series of neatly named storage areas.

An OpsCen needs to be functional and its functionality is only achieved by providing for the requirements of power protection, telecommunications (telephone set and line, LAN drop, or wireless technology alternatives), equipment and materiel, audio-visual support, environmental controls (including heating, venting, air conditioning, and lighting), individual workspace, privacy and sound abatement, etc.

More?

In addition to space and functionality requirements, other administrative considerations are important in understanding the full breadth of an OpsCen. These include:

Location. An Operation Centre permits ready access by internal staff, local officials, and other authorized visitors in times of disaster. Its location is such that the risk of being cut off by reason of floodwaters, dangerous goods accidents, rail derailments, or major air disasters is minimized.

Security. The confidentiality of information and the sensitivity of disaster response and recovery activities dictate strict access control and monitoring.

Parking.

• The number of parking stalls provided is determined by accounting for the OpsCen’s maximum staff compliment as well as the upper limit of attending participants at meetings.

• Local historical winter weather conditions dictates whether or not parking stalls are equipped with electrical outlets, and

• The 24-hour, 7-day/week nature of OpsCen duties dictates a need for adequate nighttime illumination.

Conclusion

The above paragraphs prescribing and pictures illustrating an OpsCen are intended to help provide a better understanding of the broader scope of OpsCens and goes to answering the questions: “What they are? What their purpose is? Who staffs them? What they look like?”

Having discarded the one-room-general-purpose-all-in-one perception and looking for the organization’s Opscen now may lead to the discovery that most of the space, materiel, and administration considerations defining an OpsCen are, in some cases, already in place but have never formally been confirmed, labeled, or prepared accordingly. In other cases, the discovery will reveal gaps and deficiencies between actual space and resources available and the prescriptive suggestions of this article.

In any case, events calling an OpsCen into play invariably pose extraordinary decision-making challenges and the activity level associated with disaster operations may be exacerbated by noise, confusion, and chaos. Prescribing the OpsCen is useful in imposing order and structure in the management of disaster operations where there may be little or none.

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM ®

to HERT or not to HERT: a Visit Report

Ex CADUCEUS MAJOR – Visit Report Observations from a visit to a joint full-scale exercise conducted by PHAC and PSC in Toronto (November 2007)

Background

The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) established the National Office of Health Emergency Response Teams (NOHERT) within its Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response to improve its ability to respond in a coordinated and efficient manner to support provincial, territorial and local government management of health emergencies.  The consequences of disaster often impose heavy demands on health systems to maintain existing health care services and to step up emergency treatment for disaster victims. In Canada, an afflicted jurisdiction can call on its neighbours and the federal government to draw upon additional all-hazards surge capacity such as NOHERT.

NOHERT is responsible to deploy all-hazards Health Emergency Response Teams (HERTs) that are capable of dealing with most emergency care priorities. The HERTs core capability contributes emergency medical response and mental health available for austere conditions. Teams can be enhanced with trauma, paediatrics, burn treatment, decontamination, infectious disease response and other capabilities to protect Canadians in need.

NOHERT leads Public Health Agency of Canada efforts to establish and train HERTs located in strategic locations across Canada. The Teams comprise practicing physicians, nurses, paramedics and other medical professionals who volunteer for up to two weeks of training and exercising annually. Medical Operations are supported by dedicated Mission Support Teams who manage all aspects of logistics and facilities administration onsite at a disaster location.

Exercise CADUCEUS MAJOR

NOHERT developed and designed this exercise to test the ability of HERTs to deploy and treat simulated patients with a range of serious injuries and ailments over a 24 hour period. PHAC’s National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS) provided portable hospital equipment and medical supplies and the logistics and transport needed to support the response.

For this exercise, NOHERT joined with Ontario’s Emergency Medical Assistance Team (EMAT) in order that interoperability could be assessed and best practices for medical operations developed. Exercise CADUCEUS MAJOR was conducted in joint partnership with Public Safety Canada’s Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Program. HUSAR Teams (Vancouver, Calgary, the province of Manitoba, Toronto and Halifax) were to demonstrate a continued ability to deploy and sustain operations using a unified command system.

The exercise scenario was set in the fictitious community of Constellation, Ontario – described as the financial centre of Canada. An explosion occurred in a busy office complex linked by a pedestrian walkway – it was not known if the explosion was a terrorist attack or accident. Massive and urgent efforts were required to evaluate risks of further explosions or possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. It would become quickly apparent that outside assistance would be needed to support intense efforts to stabilize damaged buildings, rescue trapped victims and provide immediate medical aid.

Organizers estimated that Exercises CADUCEUS MAJOR would represent one of the largest simulations of its type in Canada. Close to 1,000 personnel would be onsite, working 24 hours a day over the weekend as responders, simulated victims and evaluators. To prepare for the exercise, NOHERT trained 165 medical responders and mission support teams (who would maintain facilities and support medical operations). PHAC allocated $2.3M to equip and prepare HERTs to respond.

The key NOHERT goal was to gain the experience and hard evidence to validate a core or generic configuration and contribute to future HERT “blueprints”.

It was stated in writing that “NOHERT and its partners are committed to the development of a comprehensive approach to managing public health emergencies through a Pan-Canadian system with a robust, integrated and seamless emergency preparedness and response capacity. For Canadians, the benefit will be improved capability to face any disaster that would require prompt, organized medical assistance.”

 Observations

The observations I make by way of this Visit Report brush on my personal level of understanding, the scenario, the set-up, and interoperability and integration aspects of the HERT.  Although I might make observations on other aspects of the exercise, e.g. HUSAR, these are out of scope.

Personal level of understanding

I fully understand that an event such as an explosion in a downtown busy office complex in a “financial centre of Canada,” with the possibility of thousands of casualties, would create a considerable (overwhelming) surge on the affected community’s health services.  However, I would expect, following recent events beginning with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 series of attacks, and the London City bombings, that most urban hospitals today should have common, all-hazards, Incident Command/Management Systems in place and that these hospitals should also have areas internal to hospital (and perhaps immediately adjacent to the hospital) pre-designated for de-con, triage, minor treatment, etc., to alleviate the pressure caused by a surge event.  

Expectedly, there may be medical staffing, materiel, and accommodation resource shortages at (hospital) site and regional levels. It follows that, at provincial/territorial/federal levels, support/response initiatives should and would be focused on easing these expected resource shortages in short delay.  Unfortunately, what I learned and observed on November 23, 2007, did little to reassure me of any such thing.   

I found the statement in the backgrounder provided at the exercise briefing that “…HERT core capability [is designed] for austere conditions” a little puzzling.  Urban hospitals responding to disasters may indeed experience a lack of necessary resources, but are, in my opinion, far from suffering from “austere conditions.” Perhaps the word “austere” requires more explicit definition. In the mean time, it appeared to me that NOHERT capability, as demonstrated, is better suited to meet (intended for) more rural (austere) applications.

Scenario

The deployment of NOHERT resources was centered on an explosion in a “busy office complex linked by a pedestrian walkway…” with the possibility of “further explosions or possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.”

It was not stated explicitly in the backgrounder that the event was CBRNe associated, but mention of CBRNe was made at the briefing and was often overheard on site.  What was mentioned at the briefing, however, was that “…our cousins from CSIS have given us advanced notice of a possible event,” thereby allowing the pre-positioning of resources nearby.  I question the realism of this statement and assumption… How long would it take to assemble, deploy, and set-up NOHERT/NESS on zero notice?

In this scenario NOHERT is supported by NESS and Ontario EMAT resources.

Set-Up

Staging Area.  The staging area was adjacent to the Regal Constellation demolition site which was “moulaged” to add realism to the scene.  I overheard many oohs and ahhs, and would agree that “tent city” was quite impressive. Nevertheless, I have many questions surrounding this type of deployment in support of an urban scenario.

Tent City

The scenes of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, Ground Zero at NYC, and the City of London in the immediate after-math and beyond show no pictures of tent cities, lumber mills, or on-scene treatment areas. The evidence to date would suggest that first responders (with augmentation from other agencies and organizations from other jurisdictions and surrounding areas) work hard to rescue, triage, stabilize, and transport as quickly as practicable to existing health services institutions, i.e., hospitals.

In response to a sudden impact mass casualty event, hospitals and health service providers activate their mass casualty incident plans, innovate, and improvise to the best of their ability and resources and begin receiving casualties from EMS, self-presenting, or otherwise.  In the urban setting, I can’t think of a better way to deal with casualties but to rapidly transport them to established trauma centres.

With respect to the proximity of “tent-city” to the disaster site, I understand and the organizers explained that it would not necessarily be as close to the wreckage (and potential danger) as it was. But it does beg the questions: “If the event were to happen on the corner of Bloor and Yonge, where would you find the real estate to set all of this tentage, and generators, and semi-trailers, and lumber-mill?” “Would you really have to?” and “What if it was a CBRNe event?”  I did not notice (was not shown) any decontamination areas or HOT and COLD Zones. There was only one “Triage” entrance and was in no way ready to receive dirty patients.

Lumber-mills. In any case, and back to the set-up, I was awed that in the 21^st century we should be relying on lumber as much as it appeared we were.  Lumber may be available in large quantities in this country, but how long would it take in a sudden-impact mass casualty event to have all of this lumber found and delivered to the site? Where did it all come from?  Is it part of the HUSAR inventory?

MB USAR Lumber Mill

Although outside the scope of this observation report, I was amazed that Canadian Heavy Search and Rescue Task Forces resource inventory would not include re-usable hydraulic stabilization, jack systems, and other wreckage support/shoring systems other than lumber milling equipment. Are the table-saws and other carpentry equipment part of the HUSAR inventory? I noticed a large component of the MB HUSAR Task Force was committed to carpentry.  Is this the best use of EMS/FireFighter and Rescuer resources?

Another surprise to me, and others in our tour group, was that these hundreds of pieces of lumber would be manually hammered together.  In response to a question from our group, the Tour Guide explained that powered hammers are too imprecise for use under these conditions and circumstances. I did not understand.

Portable Power. I was also surprised to see tons of NESS crates (more lumber) lying around the site unopened including many crated 10KW generators.  My observations revealed many rental generators on site prompting my question to the Tour Guide: “Why aren’t we using and testing the NESS generators?”  To which he replied: “Don’t know.”  Is it because uncrating the NESS equipment means that the equipment has to be re-crated later?  On this topic, why hasn’t NESS considered disbanding its carpentry shop in favour of ruggedized, re-usuable, colour-coded, plastic crating?

Equipment. It was not obvious to me what the rational was for using EMAT vs. NESS equipment, but I’m almost certain that EMAT equipment predominated the scene – the equipment in use in the medical tents appeared modern (packaged in ruggedized, re-usable, colour-coded, plastic crating) and included patient monitoring equipment, which I don’t believe is included in NESS stocks.  It was also not obvious that NOHERT/NESS connected well with the provincial EMAT.  Generally, I found the site quite untidy with NESS crates and NESS stocks strewn all over the place. 

NESS Stretchers

Medical Tent Equipment

Medical Tent Crowding

Ontario EMAT Equipment

 

Personnel Accommodations. Our Tour Guide and most of the others in expensive paramilitary wear were eager to tell us how little sleep they were operating on.  I found this condition of sleep-depravation an unsafe practice (given the work environment, consequence of error, life-safety, etc.) and disconcerting. Moreover, I was shocked at the pride NOHERT/NESS expressed over the self-contained capability of the teams/taskforces. I would have thought that the life-safety implications of the work would dictate that rescuers get better treatment than to sleep on cots under canvas in adverse weather.  I should think that, in the urban setting, hotels would be relatively vacant and that room availability would be high.  Failing that, I should think that, in the urban setting, other hard shelter arrangements would be relatively easy to make.

I don’t get the attraction to battle-like accommodations, in the urban setting, when other options are rife.  I obviously didn’t see the same glamour in the “austere” conditions of NOHERT/EMAT/HUSAR as others may have seen.

I haven’t had time to survey the aspects of HUSAR in other countries, i.e., US, Australia, New Zealand, France, UK, Germany, Israel, etc., but would be curious to compare and contrast capabilities and mind-set.

MASH.  Why would you want to set a MASH (Triage and Treatment for Red, Amber, and Green Casualties) up in the urban setting teeming with trauma hospitals?  On the medical set-up, I found access doors too narrow for speedy movement of casualties, was dismayed by the uneven floors and rail systems (stretcher and litter obstacles as well as human hazards) running across certain doorways, was shocked at the less than sterile conditions of the whole area, and was surprised at all the white-boards and markers for representation of the medical situation.  When our Tour Guide was asked about automation support to the medical task, he answered: “we don’t want to be reliant on power for good management of the situation…”. I did not hasten to add that the whole set up is reliant on power.

MASH Crowding

Floor Obstacles

Situation Tracking

The scenario described in the initial briefing called for thousands of casualties.  I found the medical set-up overcrowded by staff and believe that the expectations that this type of set-up would be able to handle this type of load optimistic at best – unrealistic at worst.

There were allusions to a CBRNe event, which should have called for a chemical/biological/radiological decontamination capability and a trauma unit for blast lung, severe burn, eye, ear, and head injury.  I didn’t observe (was not shown) any such capability.

 Interoperability and Integration

Coming from a Regional Health Authority background, I was expecting to see some kind of link between NOHERT/EMAT and the standing health provider system. I saw nothing. I heard nothing. What I observed was a quasi-independent Triage and Treatment facility seeming to be working in isolation from existing health provision structures.

Some of the questions that came to mind were: Are all EMS systems continuing to function as normal? Are the EMS resources entering the event site to collect and transport casualties to hospitals?  Who gets what REDS, GREENS and AMBERS?  Are NOHERT resources tracking all casualties or only the ones they are handling? Is the health system tracking all casualties or only the non-NOHERT ones?  What about R and I? Where should families call for information regarding the status of loved ones?  Where are the NOHERT interfaces to existing social structures? Where are the NOHERT interfaces with local and existing psychosocialspiritual resources? What are the palliative resources of NOHERT?  What are the interfaces with provincial/local coroners?

I didn’t observe (was not shown or explained) the lines of authority between NOHERT and the local health authority and provincial health department.  On what authority is NOHERT deployed?  To whom does it report on arrival?  On what authority is NOHERT released?  The existence of interfaces and the capabilities of interoperability and integration are unknown to me.  

Final Comments

Immediately following a disaster event, medical staffing, materiel, and accommodation resource shortages at (hospital) site and regional levels should be expected — counted on.  It follows that, at provincial/territorial/federal levels, support/response initiatives must focus on easing these expected resource shortages in short delay.  I believe in the NOHERT concept of deploying all-hazards health emergency response teams capable of dealing with most emergency care priorities. It is valid and implementation is necessary.  To enlist teams of practicing physicians, nurses, paramedics, and other medical professionals supported by dedicated Logistics Teams for rapid deployment to a disaster scene anywhere in the country would certainly bolster medical readiness capability and grant a sense of hope to all of those local and regional health provision sites who shudder to think how they might respond on their own or even collectively to a mass casualty event, let alone one involving chemical or biological contamination.

It isn’t clear to me how the NOHERT demonstration of November 23, 2007 helps a hospital experiencing medical staff and materiel shortages fulfill its role of “first receiver” in a mass casualty incident.  

Hospitals in general and EDs in particular need to be augmented and supported in responding to and recovering from disaster events. The provincial framework in which hospitals are found must be able to request support from the federal authority who, ideally, would be able to call upon its deployable resource (NOHERT) and task it to the province who may sub-task it to a regional health authority until no longer needed (as determined by the province or the regional health authority).  

The NOHERT, in my opinion, does not have to come self-contained for 10 days or with all of the ancillary or equipment demonstrated.  Rather, it should come ready to plug in and respond to the requirements of the requesting framework and to the requirements dictated by the event.  Instead, the officials responsible for the conception and implementation of NOHERT should consider establishing event specific teams with event specific equipment. 

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®

Have you read the Senate Report on Emergency Management in Canada yet?

William Petak, writing in the Public Administration Review back in 1985, said: “Only when public administration fully accepts and prepares to meet the challenge of achieving efficient and effective emergency management will we see a significant reduction in human suffering and economic loss due to unnecessary exposure of people and property to the risks associated with a complex, technologic, urban society.”

Introduction. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Report entitled: Emergency Preparedness in Canada: How the fine arts of bafflegab and procrastination hobble the people who will be trying to save you when things get really bad... (http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Committee_SenRep.asp?Language=E&Parl=39&Ses=2&comm_id=76), was released for public consumption September 2, 2008. The report comprises four volumes, but one need only read the first volume (225 pages) to get the full picture. 

The 2008 Report follows an earlier report from March 2004 entitled: National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines, which I read at the time with great interest and naive anticipation of a transformation. Four years later, after having read the follow-on, I’m disheartened but not surprised by the finding that the Government has been unhurried to address the 2004 recommendations. I am, however, grateful to Senator Kenny and his Committee for not letting up on the Government and for revealing / confirming our Emergency Management shortfalls here in Canada.

I believe that Senator Colin Kenny (Chair) and his Committee deserve to be commended for their discoveries and recommendations. I, for one, wholeheartedly agree with the tone of the Report and empathize with the frustration experienced by Senator Kenny, his Committee, and the surveyed practitioners in Emergency Management. I’ll readily attest that watching paint dry is not, nor ever will be, an enviable endeavour.
Although it would be my pleasure to provide additional support to each of the Committee’s twelve recommendations, I’ll leave it to others to pick up on this possible theme for future articles. In the mean time, with your permission kind reader, I’ll comment generally on Recommendations 6, 8, and 9 in two parts, namely: “Lessons Learned” and “First Responder.” Finally, I’ll offer an opinion on “Competencies.”

Lessons Learned. One of the characteristics of disaster (emergencies) I’ve found is “memory effacement.” Otherwise put, memory becomes a post-event casualty. As we have all witnessed, our concern for all of the obstacles and barriers experienced during the disaster response seem to fade quickly once the post-event mutual congratulations take over. “What a great job we all did!” becomes the enduring quote.

I strongly agree with the Committee and surveyed practitioners that too many disaster (emergency) responses have not been clearly audited or recorded for prosperity in “lessons learned” documents. What’s more is that the information from after-action reports might help (if acted upon) to develop and implement mitigation strategy as quickly as practicable after the event and before the next one. Hey, there might even be consequential (and drastic) reductions in the nearly billions of dollars doled out by Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements post-event!

First Responders (…and the rest). There can be no argument regarding the vital and integral role played by First Responders with respect to public safety and life saving – a role vastly intensified by disaster events. Moreover, I agree that the First Responder must be given more consideration than has been given, especially in the areas of training, communication, equipment, and information.
However, in order to clear up any misconception that First Responders should be considered de facto emergency managers, I suggest that the role of Emergency Managers needs to be more fully understood and underscored. First Responders have a specific role to play which should be free from the encumbrance of additional Emergency Management responsibilities [see Competencies below].

In addition to emphasizing the importance of the First Responder and the Emergency Manager, their functions and requirements, there are others who are equally integral to Emergency Management and who might also have requirements for training, communication, equipment, and information including:

 Provincial / territorial / municipal elected and appointed officials responsible for the administration of emergency management legislation and other statutory Acts and Regulations; and 

First Receivers, i.e., the nurses, physicians, emergency social service staff, psycho-social and spiritual professionals, and Non-Government Organizations who are there to collect, triage, and treat a) those delivered by First Responders and b) those who self-present for treatment or solace and comfort. 

Another group of stakeholders who should be kept in the information loop are the higher learning and certificate students of Emergency Management and their professors / instructors.

Competencies. Like Senator Kenny and his Committee, I find it shocking, if not alarming that the Government of Canada doesn’t demonstrate a better comprehension of the criticality of Emergency Management. However, in thinking about why the government’s responses and attitudes might be what they are, perhaps the issue of “competency” may play a part.

Emergency Management is not, nor should be, the province of the “hacker.” How many in the employ of government at all levels are acting as Emergency Management professionals without the necessary competencies? How many got the job from having missed “that” meeting, or just being at the wrong place at the wrong time? I wonder, are there any financial analysts crunching numbers in government without credentials in accounting?

I ask these questions because Emergency Management (formerly “Emergency Preparedness” – dating back to Civil Defence and Cold War days) is finally evolving into a profession. In the main, it is now realized there is too much at risk in the improper management of disasters / emergencies (loss of life, destruction of property, harm to environment) to leave it to folks who, albeit well-intended, may not fully comprehend the business of disasters, the business of management, or the business of best or evidence-based practices for managing the mitigation of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from disasters. What’s important to know is that the business is more than just “preparedness and response.”

The generally accepted definition of Emergency Management today is the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which “communities” (defined as you like) reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with emergencies. In the context of most essential public sector activity, this function could be further characterized by:

a) enabling mitigation of and preparedness for actual and potential threats within geographical areas of responsibility;

b) facilitating and maintaining a heightened state of readiness throughout those geographical areas of responsibility to assure prompt, safe, correct, and consistent response to and recovery from a disaster / emergency using an all-hazards approach; and

c) promoting the safeguarding of population served while continuing to provide “continuity of government” through the disaster / emergency event.

Discounting the intense and sustained effort involved in responding to an event, Emergency Management is a full-time job which includes the performance of regular hazard and vulnerability analyses, capability assessments, and resource inventories; the preparation, conduct and evaluation of exercises (table-top, functional, and full-scale) and drills; the development and revision of all-hazards plans and guidelines, and disaster specific annexes; the maintenance of operations centre readiness; and on-going professional development obligations.

On the subject of achieving competencies, I discovered a few years ago that the Government of Canada (Public Service Commission) offered a Career Assignment Program which outlined Manager Leadership Competencies in a comprehensive and impressive document. This document could formerly be found at http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/cap/03/mgnarr_e.htm, but I can’t find it anymore. I’ve also noticed that Treasury Board has no problem detailing the core competencies required by management staff in IT projects in the Canadian federal government at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/emf-cag/project-projet/documentation-documentation/pmcc-cbgp/pmcc-cbgp01-eng.asp. I’m compelled to ask “why couldn’t the Government of Canada provide the same stringent requirements in the area of Emergency Management (a profession)?

I don’t want to take up much more of your time dear reader, but I’m including a link to a paper entitled: “Outlines of Competencies to Develop Successful 21st Century Hazard or Disaster or Hazard Risk Managers” by Wayne Blanchard, PhD, CEM®. It’s dated, but only goes to show that the evolution of Emergency Management as a profession is not new (http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/downloads/CoreCompetenciesEMHiEd.doc).

Conclusion. I want to reiterate that I sincerely appreciate and am grateful to Senator Kenny and his Committee for revealing / confirming our Emergency Management shortfalls here in Canada.
I believe that the Report correctly and appropriately underscores areas where the Government of Canada needs not only to put a more urgent face on Emergency Management, but to address the problems identified with more than “bafflegab and procrastination.” I only hope that this Report will get more attention than did the 2004 one. It can only get better — right?

Prepared by: Guy Corriveau, B.Sc., MPA, CEM®